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Lord and Untermeyer: Inside Reagan’s Navy: The Pentagon Journals

Bismarck on 27 May after a lucky aerial
torpedo hit disabled the ship’s steering
mechanism. Not so Robert Winklareth.
His focus instead is on Bismarck’s “singular triumph” in destroying the British
battle cruiser Hood three days earlier.
A 38 cm shell from its fifth salvo sliced
through Hood’s armored side below
the aft turrets, setting off first the 4 in.
secondary armament magazine and
then the main 15 in. magazine. Only 3
of its complement of 1,421 survived.
So, what is new? Winklareth, a military weapons systems expert, traces all
action at sea in five-second intervals.
He primarily uses translated German
records of the battle of the Denmark
Strait to offer a salvo-by-salvo analysis,
to re-create the speed and headings of
the major combatants, and to determine
the precise firing angles and effects of
the heavy guns. Unsurprisingly, the book
is highly detailed and a feast mainly for
naval engineering and gunnery enthusiasts. It is complemented by countless charts, diagrams, photographs,
and pencil drawings (by the author).
Winklareth’s own battle is with the
(unnamed) historians who claim that
just before the engagement with Hood,
Bismarck, in a mere six minutes, came
up the port side of the heavy cruiser
Prinz Eugen, crossed its wake to its
starboard side, and then recrossed the
cruiser’s wake to take up position on its
port side again (15–16, 258). What he
calls a “reversed photo” error resulted
in this assumption. Few will cross
swords with the author on this matter.
On the other hand, serious historians
of the battle will take umbrage at two
of Winklareth’s strong statements, both
on the first page (11) of the book. His
claim that the battle of the Denmark
Strait “was undoubtedly one of the most
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famous and most important naval battles
of World War II” will raise the hackles
especially of historians of the U.S. Navy
in the Pacific 1941–45. And his second claim, that the encounter between
Bismarck and Hood “is perhaps the most
documented event in naval history,”
will come as news to German naval
historians who are all too aware of the
fact that Bismarck’s war diary (Kriegs
tagebuch) went down with the ship.
With regard to the broader aspects of the
battle of the Denmark Strait, Winklareth
spends a great deal of time sketching
out the past histories of the German and
British navies as well as the major ship
designs of the two powers. The actual artillery duel between the German
battleship and the British battle cruiser,
in fact, consumes but half a dozen pages
of chapter 13. Unfortunately, there is
no attempt to place “Operation Rhein
übung,” the German sortie into the
Atlantic, into the wider context of Grand
Admiral Erich Raeder’s double-pole
strategy of attacking Britain’s maritime
commerce with two modern battle
fleets in the Atlantic Ocean, while a
third fleet of elderly battleships tied
the Royal Navy down in the North Sea.
The reader deserved this analysis.
HOLGER H. HERWIG

Untermeyer, Chase. Inside Reagan’s Navy: The
Pentagon Journals. College Station: Texas A&M
Univ. Press, 2015. 352pp. $25

The Washington diary is something of a
lost art these days. Instead, we have to be
satisfied with books of instant journalism using largely anonymous sources or
memoirs too often tendentiously crafted
after the fact. Chase Untermeyer is a
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wonderful outlier. Apparently, Untermeyer started keeping a diary at age
nine, and has already published excerpts
covering his initial Washington service
as executive assistant to Vice President
George Bush (1981–83). This latest
volume covers the period of his service
in the office of the Secretary of the
Navy (1983–88), during the tenures of
John F. Lehman and later James Webb
as Secretary of the Navy. The result
is an engaging portrait of the glories
and miseries of life within the Beltway.
Though lighthearted and refreshingly
modest, Untermeyer’s book also offers
up telling anecdotes and keen insights
into the practice—or lack thereof—of
civilian control of the United States Navy
at a critical juncture of the Cold War.
Though he had served briefly in the
Navy as a very junior officer, Untermeyer was the classic political appointee.
Born in Texas and educated at Harvard,
he became involved in Texas politics and
was elected to the statehouse in 1976.
After his stint working directly under
the vice president, Untermeyer was
appointed initially as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Installations
and Facilities, and then for some four
years served as Assistant Secretary for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Both
jobs are political plums, offering many
opportunities for ingratiation of the
holder with defense contractors and
members of Congress. Untermeyer
makes no attempt to hide his own ambitions, or the intoxicating effects of
constant mingling with the good and
the great not only in Washington but on
many tours of inspection or protocol in
the provinces. (At one point, he charmingly announces that he has at last become a “toff ”). But he also makes clear
that he took his responsibilities seriously
and was intent on serving the boss well.
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And what a boss! To get the flavor of
John Lehman, it is hard to improve on
this riff of Untermeyer’s at Lehman’s
farewell party at the Naval Observatory
in April 1987: “People have asked me,
what’s the difference between Jim Webb
and John Lehman? And I’ve said that the
thing to remember is that Jim is a former
Marine officer. Tell him to take a hill,
and he’ll take the hill. But with John it’s
a little different. Tell him to take a hill,
and the first thing he’ll do is get together
with Mel Paisley [perhaps best described
as his consigliere] for a few drinks to
concoct the plan. . . . Then John will
start a competition among real estate
agents over the purchase price of the
hill. Next he’ll go to the senator in whose
state the hill is located and make a deal:
the Navy will build the chrome bumperguard assembly for the Trident sub in
his hometown if the senator will slip an
amendment into the Wild and Scenic
Areas Act to purchase the hill. Then,
with the money saved from the competition, John buys another Aegis cruiser.”
Lehman’s methods did not appeal to
everyone, and in fact could be outrageous; but he could claim results. He
nearly achieved the “600 ship Navy”
for which he lobbied so ferociously. But
the Navy leadership was ambivalent
toward him. He had a habit of breaking Navy crockery—for example, by
forcing the Naval Academy to put more
humanities in its curriculum, and by
engineering the retirement of Admiral
Hyman Rickover (the story of Rickover’s
tantrum in his departing courtesy call
with Ronald Reagan is told with great
relish at the beginning of Lehman’s
memoir Command of the Sea). Anyone
concerned about the current state of
civil-military relations in Washington
would do well to read this book.
CARNES LORD
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